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1. INTRODUCTION 
The idea of studying a two-person zero sum differential game in which 
the two players make their moves alternately, so that neither player has an 
information advantage throughout the game, is due to Danskin [l]. In this 
paper, by adapting the methods of [4], we relate the values of two differential 
games of this kind to the solutions of two nonlinear parabolic equations. 
It is then immediate that the values of the games obtained by considering 
finer and finer partitions of the time interval exist. In one game the players 
play constant controls at each step; in the other, measurable functions. 
It is of interest that in general the values are not equal. In the case of alternate 
play with piecewise constant controls (which is the only case discussed 
in [l]), the idea of using partitions in MN subintervals rather than just 
partitions in M subintervals is due to Danskin. However, the technical 
details here are significantly different. Thus, in particular, Danskin does 
not use the theory of parabolic partial differential equations. 
Two interesting “intermediate values” 4, and & , 0 ,< (I < 1, of a function 
4(y, Z) of two variables arise. d,, occurs when piecewise constant controls 
arc introduced, and this intermediate value is implicit in Danskin’s paper. 
4, lies between 
and 
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Here C#J is bounded, and y and z belong to compact sets Y and Z, respec- 
tively. 
c$~ is defined similarly, but using measurable control functions. It turns 
out that 
2. DEFINITION AND EXISTENCE OF & 
Consider a bounded function +(y, z) where y and z are elements of 
compact sets Y and Z, respectively. For 0 < (J < 1 write 
Vn”(z) = my mj-+#(y, z) -I- (1 - u)$(y, 5) + K&3, 
Vo”(z) = 0, 
Vnu = m;ln Vmu(z). 
Then V,,” is the value of a two-person zero sum game with 2n + 1 moves 
and payoff J-+(JJ, z) dt. Minimizing player /z , who chooses elements of Z, 
makes an initial choice of z at time 0 and then makes choices at times j + (J, 
j = O,..., n - 1. Maximizing player Jr , who chooses elements of Y, makes 
choices at times j = O,..., n - 1. 
Suppose 
B = mya m;x / C&V, z)l. 
By expanding V$+,, we get 
I$+, = min max min *** max min(u&y, , zs) + **a 2. (1 - u)+(JJ~+~, z,,,)), 
=o Yl =2 Ym+n %+n 
from which it is easily seen that 
; V&7&- V,,,” - Vnu 1 < 4B. (2.1) 
Consider the sequence rno -:: V,“/n, n = 1,2,... . Notice that r, can be 
considered as the value of a two-person zero sum game played over the time 
interval [0, I], where I2 makes choices of z E Z at times 0 and (j + u)/n, 
j = O,..., n - I, and Jr makes choices ofy E Y at times j/n, j = 0 ,..., n - 1. 
The following Lemma is similar to a result for the special differential 
game discussed in paragraph 3 of [I]. 
LEMMA 2.1. The sequence {T,,“} is convergent. 
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Proof. From (2.1), for all m and n: 
IT ;+,, - (mrmo)/+n + n) - n~,~,/(rn + n) j < 4B:m + n. 
Consequently 
I Gn - [m(n - l)/mn]r~~,-,) - mr,,“;‘mn .< 4B/mn, 
i.e., 
1 I& - [(n - 1),/n] Y:,(,-~) - ~,~,‘n < 4Blmn. 
SO 
(2.2) 
I YE, - (n - I)/n{r&,-,) - (m(n - 2))h(n - I) Y&(,-~) - mr,“/m(n - 1)) 
- [(n - 2)/n]r&-,) -2r,“,/n [ < 4B/mn, 
i.e., 
I cm - [(n - 2)/n] Y&(,+) - ~Y,,,~$z I d 2(4B:‘mn). 
Continuing we obtain 
Similarly 
Consequently 
(2.3) 
and so (Y,o} is a Cauchy sequence. 
Write 
4, : .. lim yno. *+a, 
Then 
(2.4) 
(2.5) 
(2.6) 
(2.7) 
DEFIA-ITION 2.2. A function m(t) from [a, b] into a metric space M is 
said to be measurable if the composite functionf(m(t)) is Lebesgue measurable 
for all continuous real f on M. 
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.Lr([a, 6]), (resp. &!,([a, !I])), will denote the space of measurable functions 
on the interval [a, b] with values in Y (resp. 2). 
Similar to the definition of V,,O we can consider a game in which Jr and Jz 
make choices of controls at the same times, but they may now choose 
measurable functions instead of constant controls. For 0 < (T < 1 we write 
Wnu(z) = sup inf 
ve”fzK,eJ.11) +v*(b*l+OI) 
x (s,” 4(r(t>, z(t)) dt -i- s,l C(rN, 5(t)) dt + WX)), 
However, because jr and Jz are now playing functions, they can anticipate 
their opponent’s choice of control and 
Therefore, if 
w,m L n(ucjl + (1 - u)+J. 
We 
ST3 =~-C&+(l -u)~O, n 
WC have 
3. ALTERNATE PLAY DIFFERENTIAL GAMES 
As in the previous papers [2, 43 we consider a differential game G(0, 0) 
of prescribed duration [0, I] with control sets Y and 2 which are compact 
metric spaces. The dynamics of G are given by the system of differential 
equations (x E P) 
$ = f(4 2, Y, 2) (3.1) 
and initial condition x(O) = 0 E Rm. Here f: [0, 1] x Rfn x Y x 2 -+ Rm 
is a continuous function satisfying a uniform lipschitzian condition in x 
and t of the form 
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The payoff is given by 
P = g(x( 1)) + I,’ h(t, s, y, 2) dt. 
Here h: [0, I] x R”’ x Y x 2 ---f R and g: Rnl + R are continuous. We 
suppose h is also uniformly lipschitzian in t and x. 
To simplify the exposition we first suppose that P has the form 
P =-: g(x( 1)) (3.3) 
where g is twice continuously differentiable, and its derivatives Zg/at, 2g/ilxi , 
and Z2g/8x, axj are all uniformly lipschitzian in (t, x). We write K for the 
Lipschitz constant in all cases. The case wherefsatisfies the weaker Lipschitz 
condition of [2] and g and h are continuous may be treated by approximation 
and by introducing the extra trajectory variable k,, i = h(t, x,y, z), as in 
[2 and 43. 
Further, we may suppose that j and g vanish outside some bounded set 
(see [2], Section 9). 
Method of Play 
The game is zero sum, so the player Jl controlling they variable is trying 
to maximize P while J2 controlling the z variable is trying to minimize P. 
For any positive integer N consider a partition of the time interval [0, 1] 
into N equal subintervals of length 6 = l/N. Write tj = j8 for 0 < j < N, 
and Ii =r [0, tJ, Zj = (tjml , tj]. 
Previously Fleming [5] and Friedman [9] have approximated the method 
of play in differential games by considering for each N an “upper” and 
“lower” game. In the “upper” game J2 played first on each interval Ij 
(by choosing a constant control value z, in [5] or a measurable control 
function zj(t) in [9]). With the knowledge of the control chosen by J2 , Jl then 
played second on lj. In the “lower” game J1 played first and J2 second 
on each interval Ij . Throughout an upper or lower game, therefore, either 
J1 or J2 , respectively, has an information advantage. 
However, in [I] a more natural method of play was introduced by Danskin, 
in which J1 and J2 play alternately as follows (cf. the definition of Y,~o). For 
0 < 0 < 1 and 0 < j < N - 1 write tj+, =- (j + 0)/h’. Play commences 
at t, = 0 with the choice by J2 of a0 E 2. Also at t, , and with the knowledge 
of a,, , J1 chooses y, E Y. Then at ti+o, with the knowledge of a,, ,..., zj 
and y1 ,..., yj., i , J2 makes a choice of aill E Z, and at t, , with the knowledge 
of a0 ,..., zj and ~1 ,.*.,yj, Jl makes a choice of yj+i E Y. The choice of 
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these control values determines piecewise constant control functions and a 
trajectory from the dynamical equations (3.1). Write 
VCN(o, 0,O) = tnin tnax tnfn ... n-i-i rn$i g(x( 1)). 
1 (3.4) 
The symbols 0,O in the argument of VC” indicate the initial condition 
1 :.- 0, x = 0. 
This is the value of the approximating 2N + 1 stage differential game 
GCv(u, 0,O) (C for piecewise constant controls), in which ]i and Ja have 
“reaction times” (1 - o)/N and o/N, respectively. 
In this paper we also consider another kind of alternate move game 
GP(u, 0, 0), (F for functions), in which the players choose their controls 
at the same times as in GCN(u, 0,O) but the two players are now allowed 
to choose measurable functions. The method of play, therefore, now 
generates a family z,,(t), n(t), zi(t),..., y,(t), zn(t) of measurable functions, 
which on substituting into the dynamics (3.1) give a trajectory x(t) and 
payoff g(.r(l)). The value of GP(u, 0,O) is then 
VP(u, 0,O) = $f, SI$ ... sup inf g(x(1)). 
0 u,(t) z,(t) 
(3.5) 
Again in GFN(u, 0, 0), ]i and Ja have reaction times (1 - u),/N and U/N 
respectively. 
By adapting the methods of [4] we rove that VP(u, 0,O) and VFN(u, 0,O) p 
are approximated by the solutions of certain nonlinear parabolic equations; 
consequently lim,,, VCN(u, 0, 0) and lim,,, VP(o, 0,O) exist. 
Remark 3.1. If the payoff g(x( 1)) in the GC’ game is replaced by g($l)) 
where i(t) is the trajectory of the finite difference equation corresponding 
to x(t), then the new u-value obtained as N + co exists and is the same 
as VC(u, 0,O). In fact this value can be obtained as the limit of the solutions 
of the same parabolic equations. 
4. STRATECIPS AND STOCHASTIC GAME 
Consider now a partition of the time interval [0, 1] into MN equal sub- 
intervals. Write for p, q integers 
t(m) = (PN + d/-MN, O<p<M, O<q<N, 
b.e+o) = (PN + q + o)lMN, for O<u<l, 
and 
t, = b.0) * 
We uk the convention that (p, N) = (p + 1,O). 
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Remark 4.1. To discuss GF games it is not necessary to consider :VlN 
partitions; however, to develop the results for GC and GF games simul- 
taneously, GF games will be discussed in this setting. MN partitions arc 
necessary in GC games because for a fixed (1, x, p) we wish to discuss in 
Section 7 the approximation as N --, co of the o value & of the hamiltonian 
However, as observed in Section 2, when functions are used, no convergence 
is required to obtain the other intermediate value B. . 
With the pattern of play described in Section 3 we wish to discuss 2Nj -- 1 
stage games GCMN(u, tj , 4) and GFMN(u, tj , 5) starting at the intermediate 
time tj -_ j/M at position 5 E R”‘. This game begins with the choice by Js 
at time tj of a control value zjeO E Z in GC, or a measurable control function 
~~,~(t) E Mz([tj , tcj.O,]) in GF. Then, also at time lj and with the knowledge 
of zj,s (resp. zj,s(t)), I1 chooses a control yj.1 E Y in GC (or a control function 
Yj.lCt) EAl([ti 9 t(j.l)l) in GF). 
The players then play alternately with the knowledge of previous moves, 
Js choosing controls ~,,~,.t E 2 in GC (resp. control functions ~~+~(t) 
in GF), at times Q,,@,~) , and J1 choosing controls yD,a+I E Y in GC (resp. 
control functions ~~,~+.r(t) in GF), at times t(,,,) . 
A strategy (Y for Jr in the game GP”(u, tj, 5) (resp. GFMN(u, tj , 5)) 
consists of functions: 
“j-1 oLj.,z ... aj.W 
%+l,l CYj.{l,? ‘** ai+l.N 
=A& 1.1 cYM..lZ ... %-1,X 
such that OL~-~,,~ is a function of sj,” ,yj,t , z,,~ ,..., yj+p,y--l , Zj+p,a-l with 
values in Y (rcsp. a function of zj.s(t), ~~,~(t) ,..., yj, p,p..l(f), Zj+v,g-r(t) with 
values in .Ml([t(j+,,,) , t(j+p,p+lj])). Write AC(j) for the set of all such 
strategies for J, in GC and AF( j) for the set of all such strategies for Jr in GF. 
A strategy /3 for /s in GP”(u, rj, 5) (resp. GFMN(u, tj , 6)) consists of a 
control value pj.0 = Zj,o E Z (resp. a function pj.0 r Zj.0 E *A*([lj , t(j.“)])) 
together with functions: 
Is,.1 Bj.2 .” Bj,.V 
Fhl.1 Pjj,1.2 “. Pj+l.h. 
B M 1.1 PM- 1.2 ... LLN 
such that fl,, D.rl is a function of zj.O , Yj.1 ,-.., Yj , P,u I , z,+p.u-~ , Y,+p.a (rev. 
a function of Zj.O(t), yj.l(t),..., Zj+.e.*-l (t),yj i-1,.* (t)). \Vrite B?(j) for the set 
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of all such strategies for Jz in GC and BF(j) for the set of all such strategies 
for Js in CF. 
Given a pair of strategies OL E AC(j), /? E K’(j) piecewise constant control 
functions y(i), z(t) for J, and Jz are determined by 
zj,n z gj.0 9 Yj.1 = (yi,r(zj.n) 
3.1 = 13j.l(zj.0 * Yj,lh Yj.2 x a,.P(zj.O T Yj.1 9 zj.l)* 
and so on. Substituting r(t) and z(t) in the dynamics (3.1) determines a 
trajectory x(t). 
The value of the game CC+‘“(o, fj , 5) is 
VCMN(u, tj ) .$) = i$-;uy Ff ... sup inf A4 >I YM-1.N w-l.N 
= min max min ... max 
=,.O Yi.1 =i.l 
min &(I )I, 
376l.N %-l.N 
and as in Friedman [9, Theorem I .4.1] it may be shown that 
_-_ ianf ianf ... inf sup 
2.0 2.1 h-1.N aj.l 
= inf sup g(x(1)) = sup infg(x(1)). 
BEBCW acAC(i) (I 6 
Similarly strategies OL E AF(j) and /3 E BF( j) determine step-by-step 
measurable control functions r(t) and z(t) over [tj , 11. These determine a 
trajectory x(t) and the value of GF”“(a, tj , 5) is 
VFMN(o, tj , 4) = inf sup ... sup inf &( 1)) 
Z,.o(‘) Y,.lW YM-,.N(t) %-1.N(~) 
L_ 
B&;j) o~;fG) gw 1) 
Stochastic Games 
We now wish to consider GCyN(a, lj, 5) and GFyN(u, tj , [), modified 
versions of GCMN(u, tj , 6) and GF”“(o, ti , 5) in which a discrete amount 6 
of “noise” is introduced into the dynamics at times tj+B, p = I,..., M - j. 
Suppose {vij , i = 1, 2 ,..., N; j -= 1, 2 ,..., m} is a collection of independent 
random variables each taking the values fl with probability l/2. Write Q 
for the vector qij E R”, where 1 < j < m, and write 7 = (T~ ,..., qN); let L 
denote the lattice of possible values of 77 in (R”)“. 
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In GCyN(o, lj , 6) (resp. GFy(u, tj , 6)) p’ iecewise constant controls (resp. 
measurable control functions) are chosen by Jr and J2 at the same times as in 
GCMN(a, tj , LJ) or GPN(a, tj , 5). A strategy 0~‘ for Jr in GCy”‘(u, t, , 5) 
(resp. GF,M”(o, t, , f)) consists of functions: 
where a:+, p is a function of z. J.0 , Yi.1 9 zi.l ,***9 Yj+v.e-1 9 %+v.c- 1 and 
%+l s***s rli+v * Write AC‘(j) (resp. AP( j)) for the set of all such strategies. 
A strategy /P for Jr in GCyN(u, tj , 6) (resp. GFyN(u, tj , 6)) consists of 
&., = zjmo E Z (resp. &,, = ~~,~(t) E A2([ij , tr,J) and functions 
where &+,,, is a function f zj.0 , Yj.1 ,..-, Yj+p.cp-1 , zj+p.p-1 , Yj+p.p and 
rlj+l P..*Y 77j+s . Write BCf( j) (resp. BP(j)) for the set of all such strategies. 
Notation 4.2. Throughout the remainder of the paper we wish to discuss 
both the piecewise constant control alternate move games GCMN(u, tj , f), 
the measurable control function alternate move games GFMN(u, tj , f), and 
the stochastic variations GCyN, GFFN of them. We have seen that the 
definitions of the strategy sets 
AC(j), A4*(j) 
BC(.i), BW 
-4CW A W) 
B@(j), Wj) 
are identical (except that one is referring to piecewise constant controls 
and the other to measurable control functions). Therefore, unless otherwise 
stated, GMN will denote either CCC’” or GF”” and A(j) will denote either 
AC(j) or AF(j), whichever is appropriate. Similar interpretations are given 
to B(j), AC(j) and Bf(j). 
Given a strategy 0~’ E A<(j), a strategy ,6P E Bc( j) and q EL a pair of (piecewise 
constant or measurable) control functions y(t), z(i) are determined by the 
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component functions of (~6 and /P. The corresponding trajectory is then 
defined to be the discontinuous solution of the equation 
.w = 5 + Jty f(l. %(a r(t), 49) df , 
where 6 =I M-l. 
The payoff is 
Pnj(u, 5, d, B) = &“(l 
For 0~~ and /+ we define 
+ l S’i2 c Tk ) (4.1) 
w.kG 
)). 
Pj(0, (, d, p) == &g(x,( l)), 
& denoting expectation. Then we define the value of CP to Jr as: 
and the u value of the game G,M”(u, tj , 5) is 
Following the convention described in Notation 4.2 this is the value of 
GC,MN or GFyN. 
5. SOME LIPSCHITZ ESTIMATES 
In this section we show the value functions defined above are uniformly 
Lipschitz continuous in t and x, and we obtain estimates for the Lipschitz 
constants. Note the results are true for both GC and GF. 
Proof. For given control functions y(t), z(t) and 7 EL: 
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and 
x(4 I,) = f1 + i t * 1,‘ 
f(T, +, 511, Y(T), W) dT. 
Writing w(t) = +,s~ qk , 
-?I(4 f”) = f” 
X,(4 I,) - f1 + i’fh .dT, fJ, Y(T), 4’)) dT - c~‘i2w(t). * t; 
Consequently, 
II x(t, 50) - 44 f,)l’ < II fo - f1 II + K [’ II x(7, fo) - ~(7, &)I1 ds 
-tj 
and 
‘, -q,(f, ob) - q(t, f,)!’ < II f,, -- f1 !I - KS: !/ ~(7, fo) - X(7, f,)ii dT. 
so 
and 
Ii .+(I, fd - &Cl, &hl < K !; 4, - t1 Ii eK. 
Consequently, 
Similarly 
‘; V”(O, tj , to) - V”(U, tj , fl),l < !! 5, - fl I’ KeK. 
‘1 L;~“(u, tj , 5,) - Vrdv(u, tj , f,)li < /: f,, - f1 I; KeK. 
Recallfand g vanish outside compact sets. Write B for their uniform bounds. 
LEMMA 5.2. Consider the games G”(u, t, , f) and GL~(u, tj , 6). Suppose J, 
pfays optimally bit that J2 plays zO on the initial intmval [tj , (j + u)/N] and 
thereafter plays optimally. Denote the corresponding value by VM(u, tj , f, z,,) 
or VCN(u, tj , f, x0), respectively. Then 
and 
1 V”‘(U, tj , f) - V”(U, t, , f, z”)I < 2BuKeKN ’ 
I VsM(o, tj , 6) - V/‘(U, tj , 5, z”)I < 2BoKeKN-‘. 
Proof. Consider the sequence of controls 
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and the sequence 
Denote the trajectories determined by the first and second sequence by 
wr(t) and xz(f), respectively. Then certainly in GN(o, tj , 5): 
1) x1 (+) - x2 (+) !; < 2Bo/N. 
As the controls are the same from then on 
I! x1( I) - x2( I)1 .< 2BoeKi:V 
(as in Lemma Xl), and so 
’ P’(a, tj , 5) - P’(u, tj , 5, zo)l -< 2BoKeX;N. 
Similarly in GcN(o, tj , 5) by Lemma 5.1 
1 VtN(u, tj , 5) - Vc"(~, tj , 6, zo)! < 2BuKeK/N. 
Remark 5.3. The next Lemma proves the continuity of the value in the 
initial time; in fact by adapting the proof of Theorem 2.3 of [IO] this result 
can be proved without requiring the Lipschitz continuity off in t. 
LEMMA 5.4. Consider the 2N + 1 stage game G’S’(~, t, , 0), where the 
interval [to , I] is divided into N equal subintervals and the game is played in the 
same manner as G,V(u, 0,O). Denote the oalue of GcN)(u, to , 0) by VV)(u, to , 0). 
Then 
1 VN(u, 0,O) - VtM)(u, to, O)\ < (B + K) toeK. 
Proof. Consider the map from [0, I] to [to, 11 given by t H t* = 
to + (1 - t,)t. Suppose strategies in G”(u, 0,O) give rise to control functions 
y(t), z(t). Then we may consider the corresponding controls y*(t), z*(t) in 
G(“)(u, to, 0) defined by 
y*(t*) = y(l) 
Z*(t*) = z(l). 
Suppose y, z give rise to a trajectory x(t) and y*, z* give rise to a trajectory 
x*(t*). Then: x(0) 7 .x*(t,) = 0 and 
g = f 0, 4th r(t), z(t)), 
dx* - = f (t*, X*(t*), y*(t*), z*(t*)). 
dt* 
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so 
dx* 
- = (I - t,)f(t*, x*(t*),y(t), z(t)). 
dt 
Consequently, 
I! dx dx* --_ i dt dt Ij G (’ - ‘“1 I’fk x(t),y(t), +)) 
Therefore, 
- f(t,, - (1 - to)4 “*(t*), y(t), +))!I + % 
,< K(l - t(J t,(l - t) + K(1 - to) II x(t) - X*(t*)!l + @ 
< i,(B + K) + KII x(t) - X*(t*)ll. 
,I x(1) - x*(l)]! < (B ; K, tot+, 
and so 
’ &UN - &*(~))I < P x K) 4++, 
I vyu, 0,O) - vyo, 2,) 0)l < (B + K) t&K 
in both the GC and GF cases. 
COROLLARY 5.5. Ifs < IV, 
1 P”+*(u, 0,O) - VMN(u, 0,O)’ < Qs/(MN + s) 
where Q = (B + K + 3BK) eK. 
Proof. We may suppose s > I. Consider the game GCMN+a(u, 0,O) and 
suppose both J1 and Jz play optimally, generating a trajectory x(t). Write 
x, = x(s/(MN + s)) and consider the game GtMN’(o, s/(MZV + s), x,). Then 
by Lemma 5.2 
IL rlWN+8(~, 0, 0) - V(MN)(u, s/(MAJ + s), x,)1 < (2BuKeKs)/MN + s. 
However, by Lemma 5.1 
[ V“+ya, s(MN + s)-1, x,) - wqu, s(Miv + s)-1, 0)l 
,< IIx,ilK@ 
< Bs(MN + s)-l KeK, 
and by Lemma 5.3 
j V(~~v)(~,s(MN + s)-1,O) - PN(~,O,O)I < (B + K)s(MN + s)-leK. 
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Combining the above three inequalities gives the result for the game 
GCMN+(u, 0,O). The proof for GFMN+8(a, 0,O) is similar but the definition 
of VFMN(cr, 0,O) in (3.5) is in terms of it&sup. rather than min.max. so 
we can only suppose that Jr and /a play “almost optimally” on the initial 
interval [0, s(MN + s)-‘1. 
Finally we quote from [4], Lemma 3: 
LEMMA 5.6. Let x,‘(t) and x(t) be the trajectories in GyN(u, tj , 6) and 
G”“(u, tj , [) corresponding to the control functions y(t), z(t) and 7 EL. Then 
II x,‘(l) - .+ 1)ll < &N2 II w I. 8 
where 6 = M-’ and [I W;I = SUpj+l<k~NI.C~+l?iI!. 
COROLLARY 5.7. 
j VyN(u, tj , 5) - VMN(u, tj , 5) < 2mKeX * E. 
Proof. Given af E k(j), /P E BI( j) and 77 EL, piecewise constant control 
functions y(t), z(t) are determined. These determine trajectories x,,‘(t) and 
x(t) in GyN(u, t, , 6) and GMN(u, tj , 6) by Eqs. (4.1) and (3.1), respectively. 
From Lemma 4 of [4] 
6(‘1 w i!) < 2mV%, 
so from Lemma 5.6 
Consequently, 
cP(II x,‘(l) - x(l)l[) < 2mceK. 
and so as in [4] 
4 g(xIe(l)) - &V))l) < 2mKc@, 
I VyN(u, tj , 8) - VMN(o, tj , c$)j < 2mKeK . E. 
6. A BANC LEMMA 
Consider the game GCMN(u, tj , 5). We now prove the analogue of Lemma 1 
of [4]. 
LEMMA 6.1. 
VC,MN(u, tj , 5) - Ff sup ... sup inf c?(VC~~(U, tj+l , x,(tr+l)))l 
9.0 a’1.1 aj+l.O *,+I.0 
< 2BKeK/MN, 
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where X,(tj, J is the trajectory determined by pjsi.” , ai,, , &, ,..., OI~+~,~ , /3j+l,o 
andr]EL. 
Proof. Given or< E AC’(j) the components u:,i , LX;,~ ,..., c~~+r,a re not 
functions of q EL and so are the first N components of a strategy a E AC(j). 
Consider any /3 E BC( j). Then 
and 
determine controls zj,“, yj.i , zj,, ,..., yj+i.a, zj.,i,a and so a trajectory x(t) 
up to time ticI . If 17 EL is also given, then from (4.1) with 6 = M-I: 
-%Sti~l) X(Lj+,) + ‘6’h)j,’ . 
Denote the possible values of Tj+r in R”l by I’. Then to OLD, /I and to each 
y E r there corresponds a value &, of x,,(rj-i), i.c., 
(, = X(tj+*) -.f Evy. 
Given y we define a strategy 
aye E ACf(j + 1) 
by saying for the component g,i+p+i,q 
“v.j+p+l.~(zj+l.O , Yj+l.l 3...tYi+e-l.p-l , zj+p+l.p-l 9 Vi+2 9.**9 77j+9+1) 
‘-’ 4+,4., ( zi.0 f Yj.1 3...9 Yjcl.0 9 zi+l.l >**.9 Yj+p+l.q-1 9 zjin+l.*-l T 
Y, 77j+2 **..9 ?j+p+l)f 
where the zj,g , yj,r ,..., yj+i,a , zj-.r,a are determined by pj.0 , aj.1 ,..., aj+r,,i , 
Bj. 1.0 . 
Now in GCyN(a, ij+r , 6,) 
uj+du., 5,, a,‘) G vCYN(u, ti+* , 5,) 
so for Y > 0 there is a /XYf E BCc(j 4 1) such that 
This is the case for each y E r so define p E K’(j) as having components 
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and then for p > 0 or q > 0 
&+~+l.dZj.o 9Yi.1 Y***) Zi+as+l.+l YYj+s+l.o 9 ?i+l , ?i+2 9***) rlj+s+l) 
= ~j+~,~+D+*.~(Zj+l.O 9 Yj+l.l >.*‘Y zj+v+l.q-l > Yi+p+l.q P %+2 9***) 77j+p+l)* 
Recall that the element zj+l.o is determined by /3j+l.o and not by &,+,,j+l.o .
Consequently by Lemma 5.2, 
As the @ E BC( j) was arbitrary, 
2BKeK 
uj(O, 5, af) < inf g( VCyN(u, lj+l , XJtj+l))) + m 
BeB(j) 
and so 
Conversely fix OL E AC(j). F or any T) EL and /3 E BC(j) there is a trajectory 
x,,a(t) given by Eq. (4.1). If ~+t --_ y E r, then write 
5: = X,B(tj+l). 
Now for any 6 E Rns and v > 0 there is a strategy LX([) E AC(j + 1) such 
that 
uj+l(", 5~46)) 2 vcYN(u, fj+l I 4) - “* 
Define a6 E AC’(j) by 
where [ is the point x,(tj+J on the trajectory determined by Zj,g ,Yjel ,..., 
Yj+l.o 3 zj+l.o and Tj+l E r 
For /3 E BP(j), (Y E AC(j) and y E r, define & E BCf( j + 1) by 
&.j-a+l.o(Zj+l.O P Yi+l.l y.** 9Yj+a+l.q-1 Yzj+v+l.q-l Y rli+2 T..., rlj-fl+l> 
= Pzj.O 9Yj.l 3.e.7 ai+l.o *Yj+l.l *.-.,Y’ 1+v+l.o-19 zj+v+l.q-l P YY 17i+2 ,..*Y %+a+1 1 
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where, as above, zj,O , yj-r ,..., yj-1 t,(, , zj / 1,0 are determined by pj,O , aj,r ,..., 
9il.0 P B j-1.0. 
Note the components pj.0 ,..., pj+r,o are independent of 7 and can be 
considered as the first N + 1 components of a strategy in IX(j). 
If we condition 7j-.r = y, 
P,,‘(o, 5, a(, 8) = e+yu, t:‘, 4r,“,, a>. 
Because a(f,,s) and p,, are independent of ‘lj+r we have 
g(p,i(U, 5, a’, S) ! 7j+l E Y) I- g(RY’(U, t,“, a(&% 13,)) 
= pj+‘(u, Q, +yB;“,, Is,) 
2 Fj-l(U, S,“, CX(6.f)) 
> VCf”“(Ul tj+l , fi:) - V. 
Therefore, 
P’(O, 5, af9 B) > gy( VC,MN(u, fj+l 9 6.i’)) - v 
= b(VCTN(U, tj+* , X,"(tj+,))) - Va 
Consequently, 
The corresponding result for GF,MN(u, tj , 5) is proved in exactly the same 
way, and so we omit the proof. However, because the players are now using 
measurable control functions the values “fit together” at time tj+r and the 
result takes the following form: 
LEMMA 6.2. 
where ~,(tj~l) is the trajectory determined by /ljen, aj., ,,.., aj+l.o, /3j+l,o and 
7EL. 
7. A PARABOLIC EQUATION 
For t E [0, I], x E R” and p E R” consider the function of y E Y and z E K: 
H(t, x, P; y, 4 = P .f(‘, x, y, 4. 
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To discuss the GC games we introduce the following hamiltonians: for 
0 < u < 1 and n = 1, 2,... we can consider the sequence of functions 
HnC(t, x, p) = rn~~ m; . . * Iyx fn” n-‘(oH(t, x, p; y1 , 20) 
+ (1 - u) H(4 x, $3 Yl > Zl) 
+ ... A- uH(t, x, p; yn , %I-1) + (1 - 4 H(h x, p; yn , 4. 
As shown in Section 2 the functions H,C converge to a limit function 
Hmc(t, X, p) and by inequality (2.7): 
i HoC(t, x, P) - HnC(t, x, r)i < (246 x, p))!n 
where B(t, x, p) = maxy max, 1 p *f(i, x,y, z)l. 
As f vanishes outside a compact set the function 
(7.1) 
B(P) = ““,P =-& B(i* x9 P) 
is finite for each p and so by (7.1) the convergence of the sequence H,,c is 
uniform over compact sets in p-space. 
To discuss the GF games we introduce the hamiltonians 
H/(t, x, p) :-- (I mzin rnvax H(t, x, p, y, z) + (1 - u) mYax n$n H(t, x, p, y, z). 
Notation 7.1. H, will denote either Hoc or HeF according to context. 
We now quote the following result from Friedman [8] or Oleinik and 
Kruzkov [ 111. 
THEOREM 7.2. For E > 0 there is a unt$ue solution 4 of the equation 
r2!2 V2+ + +/at + H,,(t, x, V+) = 0 (7.2) 
satisfying 
C( 1, I) :-= &G). (7.3) 
$ has the property that &$/at and a2+/(axi ax,) satisfy Hiilder inequalities of 
the form 
t,h(t, x) - a,h(t’, x’)[ < Q(l t - t’ Iv/* $ II x - x’ 11”) for 0 < y < 1. (7.4) 
LEMMA 7.3. Suppose VyN denotes either VCyN or VFyN. For E > 0 let 
$(t, x) be the solution of (7.2)-(7.3) in the strip 0 < t < 1. Then for any 
time tj = j/M 
SUP I4(tj y 6) - V,““(U, tj 9 t)l < CM7’2 + DN-’ 
fERrn 
578 ELLIOTT. FRIEDMAN AND KALTON 
where C and D are independent of M, N, j and E. In particular, 
syp 1 $(O, 0) - v,“*(o, 0,O)l < cM-Y’2 + DW’. 
Proof. + and its derivatives 2+/i?, +/6xj 2Xj satisfy Holder conditions 
of the form (7.4), so we may write 
0 
a24 
~(t+7.X+X)=~(t,Y)-!.i~+X.v~t~~~,X~x~+P(t,S~,X) 
t., ’ ’ 
(7.5) 
where the derivatives are evaluated at (t, x) and 
I p(t, x, 7, x): < M,(T~ .v/2 + T II x :iy i- !, x l12++f). 
Consider now the situation of the game GyN(o, tj , 5) (i.e., of either 
GCFN or GFyN) and write 
where 
Pj = (Pi.0 9 Bj.1 ,...7 13,.l.0) 
9 = Caj.i.l 
***a( ‘Yj.Ll,o 
1 
. 
Suppose two such strategies aj, /Ij determine piecewise constant (resp. 
measurable) control functions 
YCt) = (Yj.1 , Yj.2 **..7 Yi+l.O), 
z(t) = Czj,O 7 zj,l Y***Y Zj+l.O)* 
Then with V+ evaluated at (tj , 5) we write 
HN(ti > 55 v4i 9 Y Pj) = HN(ai 9 Bj) = N-l(uH(tj 9 f7 O$; Yj.1 9 zj.O) 
+ (I - u, H(tj T 59 v+; yj.1 Y zj,*) - ‘.. 
+ uH(tj 9 f, v+; Yj+l,o y zj,n-l) 
+ t1 - u, H(tj ) 6, “4; Yj+l.O 3 zi+l.O)). 
Because play is alternate and the spaces are compact, there are strategies 
q*, rS,* such that for any other ‘Ye , 13,: 
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so that in GCMN c 
HX(aj*, Bj*) = HhrC(tj t 5, v+) 
while in GFMN L 
kz&Tj*, pj*) == H&j , 5, V#). 
Consider the piecewise constant (resp. measurable) control functions r(t), 
z(t) on [ti , tj+J determined by OLD* and any strategy & . For 71 EL these 
determine a trajectory x,(t) and 
where 
,r,(4+1) = f -!- x 
As in [4] we have with 6 = M-l: 
and 
var(xi) =: 26 (the variance of xi); 
cq xi I) < 1M2W; 
&(XiXj)l < nz2s2 if i $7 j; 
j G(xi2) - E26 I < M&S2; 
We note that 
g(Xi> = If,,‘/i(tj 3 f, Y(T), Z(T)) dT + T 
t, 
where j T 1 < M,a2. 
So from these estimates WC obtain 
V+ *f(tj , 5‘s J’(T), z(T)) dT + f 6V2+ + r’ 
where 1 I’ I < CP+Y/~. 
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However, in GCY 
=.. M-‘HN(aj*, /3J > M-wNyrj , 5, Vc#) 
> M-lHoC(tj P 59 O+) - (2B(v4))IMN bY (7-l) 
while in GFMN ‘ 
I 
tJ+l 
04 * f(tj 9 5, Y(S), Z(S)) ds 3 M-‘ffeF(rj , tv V#). 
t, 
Therefore , in both GCyN and GFyN: 
(The last term is not present in the GFyN situation.) 
As /Ij was arbitrary 
If we now consider fij* played against any aj we obtain in the same way 
(Again the last term is not present in the GFyN situation.) 
For a given E > 0 and corresponding solution 4 of (7.2)-(7.3) we can 
consider the supremum Br of B(V$) over the bounded set where f is nonzero 
so that 
This estimate is uniform in 4, and C is independent of M, N and E. 
Write 
Then 
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so by Lemma 6.1: 
Aj < C(l/M)itvlP + (2&)/MN + (2BK@)/MN + /ij+i . 
Therefore, 
A, < CM-Y/2 + (2Bc + 2BKeK) N-l. 
Considering the solution 4 of (7.2)-(7.3) f or a particular 6 > 0 we therefore 
have that as M --+ 00 and N -+ co 
uniformly in 5. Therefore from Lemma 5.1 
and so 1, V+ (I evaluated at any time j/M and position e E Rm is bounded 
by KeK. Consequently 
Bc < BKeK. 
Writing D = 4BKeK the result is proved. 
8. THE EXISTENCE OF VALUE 
We now return to the games CCMN(u, 0,O) and GFMN(a, 0,O) defined in 
Section 3, whose values are denoted by VCMN(u, 0,O) and VFMN(u, O,O), 
respectively. As above, V will denote either VC or VF according to context. 
THEOREM 8. I. VN(o, 0,O) is a Cuuchy sequence, so lim,,, VN(u, 0,O) = 
V(u) exists. 
Proof. For any Y > 0, with the notation of Corollary 5.4 and Lemma 7.2, 
choose Ma such that 
Q/M < v/6 if M>M,, 
and 
C/M’+ < v/6 if M>,M,,. 
Then choose N,, such that 
DIN < v/6 if NaN,,. 
If n, and np are any integers greater than n, = Mdv, , then 
n, = WV, + s1 with Mi > M, and si < N,, , 
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and 
tl.2 M,N, + sp with M, > M,, and sp < IV,, . 
Therefore, by Corollary 5.4 
j P(u, 0,O) - V”‘N+7, 0,O)l 
< Qsli(MINo + sl) < Qs~,!P~~N, < Q/Ml < $6 
and 
Vn2(o, 0,O) - VMzNo(o, 0,O) < v/6. 
However, by Corollary 5.6, for any E: 
! V”INo(o, 0,O) - V~lNo(u, 0,O)l < 2mKeKe 
and 
I VMzNo(o, 0,O) - V,“zNo(u, 0,O) < 2mKeKc. 
From Lemma 7.2 
i q%(O, 0) - V7No(u, 0,O)l < C/M:‘” $ D/N,, < v/6 + vi6 == v/3, 
and similarly 
I f$(O, 0) - VrM~NO(u, 0 O)l < v/3. 
Consequently, as E is arbitrary, we conclude from the above inequalities 
that if n, , n2 are greater than n, 
I V”‘(u, 0 O) - vyu, 0,O)l < I’, 
and so Vv(a, 0,O) is a Cauchy sequence. 
Remark 8.2. The constants Q, C, D are independent of .$ and t so the 
same argument proves that 
$Fm vtN)(u, 1, 6) = V(u, t, LJ) 
exists and the convergence is uniform in 5 and t. 
The extension to the case where g is continuous follows by approximation 
as in [2] paragraph 9. The case where the payoff has the form (3.2) and h is 
Lipschitz can be reduced to the case considered by introducing the extra 
coordinate 
.t ,N - 44 *, y, 4 
and finally, again by approximation as in paragraph 10 of [2], we may suppose 
h is continuous. 
DIFFERENTIAL GAMES 583 
Finally, letting M + 03, N - co in Lemma 5.1 and the analogue of 
Lemma 5.3 we have: 
LEMMA 8.3. 
I V(U, f, , I,) - V(U, f, , f2)’ < (B + K) 4 f, - t2 I + !i f1 - 5, ‘II, 
that is, V(U, t, 5) is uniformly Lipschitz in t and 5. 
9. GENERALIZED SOLUTIONS 
Because Z’C(o, t, 6) and VF(u, t, 5) are uniformly Lipschitz, they are 
differentiable almost everywhere by Rademacher’s theorem. In this section 
we show that at points of differentiability VC satisfies the differential equation 
where H,,(t, x, CV) is the function defined at the beginning of Section 7, 
and VF satisfies the differential equation 
g -t- KF(f ,x,OV) = 0. (9.2) 
Of course I/C and VF satisfy the boundary condition 
VW, 1, f) - Wa, 1, f) = g(f). 
It is convenient to consider differential games starting at an intermediate 
position (f,, , x0:0), t E [0, I], which end at time t, , f, .< t, < 1. The dynamics 
are given by equations (3.1) and the payoff is t?(x(ti)), where 0 is a real 
valued continuous function on R “‘. Denote such a game by Gtl(u, r,, , x0 ; 0). 
Theorem 8.1 and the remarks following tell us that Gtl(u, t, , x,, ; 6) has 
u-values VCtl(u, t, , x0 ; 0) or VFt,(u, t, , x0 ; 0) depending on whether 
piecewise constant or measurable functions are allowed. In particular 0 may 
be taken to be one of the u-values VC or VF of the game starting at (fl , x(fJ) 
and we have the following dynamic programming result: 
LEMMA 9.1. 
VC(u, 4, ? x0) = VC&, f, > “0; VC) 
VF(u, t, , ix,,) = VF,Ju, t,, , x0; VF). 
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Proof. Suppose initially that 
i, = to + s (94 
where s --. j/M . (1 - to) for some integers j and M. First consider the game 
GC(o, t, , .x0); for any N we wish to discuss the 2MN + 1 stage approximating 
game GP’“(u, t, , x,,) and the 2Nj - 1 stage game GCy(o, t, , x,, ; VC~J~). 
For any piecewise constant control functions r(t), z(t) in GCW1v(u, to, x0) 
we have by comparing the resulting payoff in GCW”(a, t, , x,,) and 
GCcl’i(u, to , x0 ; VP”) that, as in Lemma 5.2, 
VCMN(u, to , x0) - VCT(u, to , x0; VCMN)I < 2BIW/MN. 
Letting N + co we have 
For the game GF(u, to, x0) we consider approximating games 
GP”(u, to , x0) and GFp(u, to , x0 ; VPN). Because measurable functions 
are now allowed, we have immediately 
VFMN(u, to, x0) = Vzy(0, t, ) x0; VPN). 
Letting N --+ co 
vqu, to, x0) = VF,,(u, to, x,; VF). 
The case where t, is not of the form (9.2) can then be treated by con- 
sidering a sequence of times 7, such that T,~ + to and (tr - ~,)/(l - T,) 
is rational. By the above result we have 
Because the value functions are continuous in the time variable, letting 
n + co establishes the result. 
We can now prove the main result of this section (cf. Theorem 4.4 of [3]). 
THEOREM 9.2. At points of differentiability VC(u, t, t) satisfies the ds$ 
ferential equation 
FV/& + ff,C(t, x, VV) = 0 
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and VF(o, t, 6) satisjies the differentiul equation 
a v/at + HuF(t, x, v V) = 0. 
Proof. Write V for either VC or VF. 
Suppose to , x0 , to < 1, is a point of differentiability. Then 
V(U, to + S, xo -t 5) E V(U, 10 9 x0) $ S aV/at + 5 ’ VV + (I S 1 + !I f Ii) R(S, 5) 
where R is continuous at (0, 0), R(0, 0) = 0, and the partial derivatives are 
evaluated at i, , x0 . If (to 2 s, x0 J-- t) is on any trajectory starting at (to , x0) 
I V(u, to i s, x0 + 6) - V(u, to , .r,) - s av/at - .$f ’ -7 v 1 < q(s) (9.3) 
where lim,,q(s) = 0. 
Nowfixt, =t,+swiths< 1 -to;sobyLemma9.1 
V(u, to , x0) = v&T to , x,; b’). 
Writing 
wp, + s; x) = V(u, to, x0) + s av/at + (x - x0) vv 
we have from (9.3) that 
I v&J, to, %I; v> - V&J, to 3 x0; VI < s?(s) 
so 
I V(0, to, x0) - v&J, i, , x0; W)l < q(s); 
that is, 
I v&-b to I “0; Wo)l G s?(s) (9.4) 
where Wo(to + s; x) = s SV/Zt + (X - x0) VV. 
The game GCIJu, to, x0 ; W,) (resp. GFt,(a, to, x0 ; W,)) is by definition the 
limit as N + 03 of the games GCt(u, to , x0 ; W,) (resp. GFt(u, to , X, ; W,)) 
in which the time interval [to, tl] is divided into N equal subintervals and 
play proceeds in the manner described in Section 3. 
Suppose y(t), a(t) are piecewise constant (resp. measurable) controls in 
GC$u, to, x0 ; IV,) (resp. GFfil(u, to, x0 ; IV,)). The payoff corresponding to 
A$ 44 is 
pL,$ + (x -x0) *vv 
tl av z.z 
I ( to 
ai + f (4 +>, r(Q z(t)> * VV) dt 
(where the partial derivatives, as above, are evaluated at (to, x,,)). 
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We can, however, consider the effect of the same controls r(t), z(t) in 
the 2N $ I stage game G[(o, t, , .x0 ; HN) played over the interval [to, i,] 
with payoff 
PN = jtI’ ($ - f(& 3 “0 7 r(t), z(t) . q dt. 
Now 
1 P” - PlV 1 < s 6(s) 
where lim,,, 6(s) = 0. 
Because this inequality is true for any pair of control functions we can 
conclude that in GC$a, to, x0 ; IV,) 
and so letting IV -+ CO 
In GJ’c(o, to, x0 ; wo) we have also immediately that 
From (9.4) we therefore have, in both cases, 
Dividing by s and letting s -+ 0 we conclude that at (to, x0) 
F + ffoC(to, x0, VVC) = 0 
and 
Remarks 9.3. Consider a continuous function of t, u(t), such that 
0 < u(t) < 1 for t E [0, I]. By piecewise constant approximation of u(t) it 
seems probable that a differential game, with either piecewise constant or 
measurable controls, could be considered in which the ratio of the reaction 
times of /a to Jr is the function u(t)/(l - u(t)), and the value function 
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v(u(t), t, x) of such a differential game should satisfy at points of differ- 
entiability 
EC’ 
- - H,(,)(& x, VV) = 0 8t 
where Hocl, denotes either ff$, or Hz,, . 
9.4. For t E (tj , tjfu], 0 <j < N - I, write 
HmT,(t, LX, p) = man m;x H(t, x9 P, Y, 4, 
and for t E (tj+o , tj+J, 0 < j < N - I, write 
H,$,(t, x, p) = n-y mjn H(t, x, p, y, z). 
By Theorem 7.2 above there is a unique solution &,, of the equation 
f Vz+ + g $ H$,,(t, x, V$) = 0 
satisfying &( 1, 4) = g(e). 
The methods of Lemma 7.3 can be adapted to show that 
SUP ( +N(tj 9 I$) - VFcN(tj 9 5)1 < C’N-“2. 
pERm 
However, from Lemma 7.3 
SUP I +(tj 1 5) - VFcN(tj , [)I < CW”~ 
EERm 
where 4 is the solution of (7.2) with 
H,(t, x, V+) = H,,F(t, x, V$). 
Consequently lim,,,$,(t, 5) = +(t, 6) uniformly in 5. 
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